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By HELENA VARKKEY 
 
Abstract 
Transboundary haze pollution is an almost annual occurrence in Southeast Asia. Haze originates from peat and 
forest fires mostly in Indonesia, with Malaysia and Singapore suffering the worst of its effects. Most of these 
fires are manmade, and linked to land clearing activities of local and foreign commercial oil palm plantations. 
The regional nature of the haze has resulted in a concentration of haze mitigation activities at the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) level. However these initiatives continually fail to effectively mitigate haze. 
This article argues that this is due to the influence of patronage politics in the sector. This is linked to the 
ASEAN style of regional engagement, which prioritizes the maintenance of national sovereignty. States are 
compelled to act in their national interests, as opposed to the collective regional interests. The economic 
importance of the oil palm sector to the states involved, coupled with the political importance of the clients 
populating this sector to elite patrons in the governments, meant that the maintenance of the status quo, where 
clients could continue to clear land using fire, was of crucial national interest. Therefore, the ASEAN style of 
regional engagement has enabled political elites to shape ASEAN initiatives to preserve the interests of their 
clients, while the public continue to suffer the haze. This article demonstrates this through a close analysis of the 
negotiations, outcomes and the implementation of the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution, 
with a special focus on Indonesia’s decision to withhold ratification of the treaty.  
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Regional Cooperation, Patronage, and the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution 
Transboundary haze is the Southeast Asian region’s first and most publicly-identifiable regional environmental 
crisis (Elliott 2003). This regional haze has been an annual recurring problem since the 1980s (Mayer 2006). 
Haze is smoke that originates from peat and forest fires (Tacconi et al. 2008)
1
, mostly in Indonesia, and becomes 
transboundary when it travels across national boundaries (Mayer 2006). Research has shown that most of these 
fires are manmade, and most can be traced back to illegal land clearing activities of commercial local and 
foreign (mostly Malaysian and Singaporean) oil palm plantations (Fairhurst and McLaughlin 2009; K. T. Tan et 
al. 2009; Colfer 2002; Caroko et al. 2011; Casson 2002).  
As awareness of the source and dangers of smoke haze spread, Southeast Asian governments increasingly came 
under pressure from the public and civil society at the national, regional, and international level to mitigate haze 
(New Straits Times 1997; Ho 1997). Hence, in 1997, the Myanmar Foreign Minister who chaired Environmental 
Affairs at the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at the time suggested that haze mitigation 
efforts should be carried out at the ASEAN level due to its transboundary nature, its extreme impact to society, 
and its close relation to natural resource management in the region. ASEAN member countries unanimously 
supported this as an opportunity to address civil society’s concerns. However, while there seems to be much 
visible activity at the ASEAN level to address the issue, these initiatives continually fail to effectively mitigate 
haze (B. Tan 2005; S. S. C. Tay 2002; Yahaya 2000; Nguitragool 2011; Chang and Rajan 2001).  
This article argues that regional cooperation at the ASEAN level over haze has been problematic due to the 
influence of patronage politics in Indonesia’s oil palm plantation sector. Patronage relationships is an important 
determinant of regional-level outcomes due to the style of regional engagement in Southeast Asia, which is 
characterized by the maintenance of national sovereignty (Murray 2010; Kim 2011). Therefore, states are 
compelled to act in their national interests, as opposed to the collective regional interests. The economic 
importance of the oil palm sector to the states involved, coupled with the political importance of the clients 
populating this sector to elite patrons in the governments (Ferguson 2004), meant that the maintenance of the 
status quo, where well-connected elites could continue to clear land using fire, was of crucial national interests 
to these states. The ASEAN style of regional engagement has enabled political elites to shape ASEAN 
initiatives to preserve the interests of their clients, while the public continue to suffer annually as a result of 
haze.  
This article demonstrates this argument through a close analysis of the negotiations, outcomes and the 
implementation of the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (ATHP), the most recent haze 
mitigation initiative by ASEAN. Particularly, it concentrates on Indonesia’s decision to withhold ratification of 
the treaty. It uses data obtained from fieldwork consisting of archival research and semi-structured interviews 
conducted in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore among government officials, Non-Governmental Organization 
(NGO) representatives, journalists, and academicians to argue that patronage politics in the Indonesian oil palm 
plantation sector was instrumental in this decision. It is divided into five substantive sections. The first section 
                                                 
1
 For an in-depth analysis on the nature and deep determinants of these fires and the resulting haze pollution, 
see Tacconi et al.’s earlier article in this publication (Vol. 8). 
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provides a brief overview of Indonesia’s oil palm plantation sector, to show the importance of patron-client 
relationships in this sector. The second section discusses the ASEAN style of regional engagement, discussing 
how states are able to shape regional-level outcomes to suit their national interests. The third section briefly 
discusses the negotiation process leading up to the signing of the ATHP, which begins to show how national 
political and economic interests took priority over the collective social and environmental interests. The fourth 
section focuses on Indonesian non-ratification, showing how patronage factors wielded influence over 
Indonesia’s decision at both the ministerial and parliamentary level. The final substantive section discusses how 
Indonesia’s non-ratification has seriously limited the effectiveness of the Agreement in mitigating haze.    
1 Patronage politics in the Indonesian oil palm plantation sector 
Indonesia is currently the world’s largest producer of palm oil (McCarthy 2010; Jarvis et al. 2010; Reuters 2011; 
World Growth 2011; Bernama 2010), with oil palm plantations representing more than 10% of agricultural land 
in Indonesia (World Growth 2011) and the sector contributing almost 5% of national GDP (iStockAnalyst 
2009). While the economic activities of these plantation companies in Indonesia can be assumed to be legitimate 
commercial activities not prohibited by international law, an obligation and responsibility would nevertheless 
arise on Indonesia's part to prevent or to minimise the risks of significant transboundary harm (A. K. J. Tan 
1999). 
However, much like other major economic sectors, a central feature of the Indonesian oil palm sector is the 
importance of patronage networks (H.  Varkkey 2012; Helena Varkkey 2013), especially in terms of knowledge 
and access to local markets, distribution systems, connections around local bureaucracy and business systems, as 
well as potential business partners and associates and financing (Terjesen and Elam 2009). With the particularly 
long time frames of the sector (with a crop rotation of about 20 to 30 years) firms often need to cultivate long 
term patronage relationships throughout this period.  
Thus, it is common among the top tiers of Indonesian plantation firms to have ‘functional directors’ appointed to 
perform ‘extra-economic functions’ (Gomez 2009), and ‘advisors’ who are elected on a retainer basis. Indonesia 
adopts a two-tier management structure, comprising a board of directors and a board of commissioners. 
Officially, the former manages and represents the company and the latter supervises the directors (Rajenthran 
2002). However, in reality, members of the board of commissioners (and sometimes also board of directors) are 
typically retired senior bureaucrats (mantan) who could act as intermediaries with the state and perform 
‘advisory and brokerage functions’ on behalf of the company when needed. In other words, they are elected to 
the post by virtue of their connections
2
.  
This extensive patron-client relationships prevalent within the sector (Aggarwal and Chow 2010) has meant that 
many political parties in power have direct links to these plantation interests. This situation encouraged elites to 
favour arrangements that ensure domestic and regional political economic stability and market access to these 
natural resources (Solingen 1999), while providing a lack of incentives for effective regional environmental 
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central and local level, see other publications by this author in Asia Pacific Viewpoint (Vol. 53, No. 3) and 
Environmental Hazards (Vol. 12) 
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conservation. This article therefore argues that the protection of these elite interests was more important than 
responding to environmental issues, especially haze, through ASEAN (Cotton 1999).  
2 National sovereignty and the ASEAN Way 
This article argues that the ASEAN style of regional engagement, which prioritizes the maintenance of national 
sovereignty (Murray 2010; Kim 2011), enables political elites to shape ASEAN initiatives to preserve national 
interests over the collective regional interest. This style of regional engagement enables member states to 
control the scope, depth and speed of regional cooperation in ASEAN, which best suits their national interests 
(Kim 2011).  
One important example of this in action is the strategic use of the ASEAN Way by member states. The ASEAN 
Way is a set of behavioural and procedural norms that prescribes approaches to regional interactions. This 
includes the search for consensus, the principles of sensitivity and politeness, non-confrontational approaches to 
negotiations, behind-the-scenes discussions, an emphasis on informal and non-legalistic procedures, non-
interference and flexibility (Kivimaki, 2001, p. 16). The ASEAN Way is however not a doctrine that must be 
followed at all costs. Instead, it can be seen as tools for political action that states can selectively use in line with 
their interests (Khoo 2004).  
Subscribing to the ASEAN Way when necessary shields national governments from having to commit to 
addressing joint tasks that governments either find too demanding administratively, politically difficult, or not 
sufficiently important given a set of national priorities. In keeping with non-interference norms, the parties can 
stress the primacy of national laws, policy-making and implementation (Elliott 2003). In keeping with the 
procedural voluntarism of the ASEAN Way, parties can avoid legally binding agreements. This clause, along 
with sovereignty concerns has also resulted in a lack of central institutions in ASEAN to uphold compliance or 
any credible mechanisms for settling disputes in an objective and binding manner (Severino et al. 2005). This 
complicates the application of multilateral pressure and collective problem-solving methods (B. Tan 2005). The 
non-interference clause also enables governments to exclude any issue deemed to be politically sensitive from 
ever being discussed at the regional level (Nesadurai 2008). As a result, these principles provide members with 
considerable autonomy to determine the extent to which they would implement regional environmental agendas, 
even those that they have agreed to initially (Nesadurai 2008).  
Nesadurai  has argued that ‘the ASEAN Way is often only strictly adhered to and enforced by states in areas 
where crucial economic interests are affected’ (Nesadurai 2008). Indeed, as an institution centred around the 
promotion of economic cooperation and prosperity among its members (Smith 2004), environmental objectives 
are therefore often overlooked in the pursuance of these economic goals. As a result, ASEAN has developed 
into an elite-centered framework of regional integration (Ferguson 2004), where (elite) economic growth takes 
precedence over social development and environmental protection (Nesadurai 2008). States were unwilling to 
antagonize domestic interests by applying prohibitive national- or regional-level environmental law, particularly 
when such natural resource interests are tightly bound to a leader’s political power base (Pas-ong and Lebel 
2000; Boas 2000; Aggarwal and Chow 2010). Member states sought to protect the interests of the political and 
economic elites by maintaining their ‘power of veto’ over effective policy innovation at the ASEAN level 
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(Cotton 1999). Therefore, member states were free to pick and choose instances where they would strictly 
follow the ASEAN Way, or ignore it, as long as it was in the interests of the member states’ political and 
economic elites. 
 This article thus argues that member state elites have strategically used the ASEAN Way of regional 
engagement to ensure that their political and economic interests, in this case the interests of the major players in 
Indonesia’s oil palm plantation sector, was preserved. This is especially obvious with the legally-binding ATHP, 
which is detailed below.  
3 The Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution 
Before the ATHP, member states generally avoided legally binding agreements to cooperate on environmental 
and haze matters (Elliott 2003). However, the 1997-1998 haze episode, which was the most severe the region 
had seen, sparked renewed outcry from the public and civil society. As one ASEAN official explained, this 
backlash prompted member states to agree to establish a legally binding mechanism to address haze and appease 
civil society. Therefore, in 2001 the ATHP was proposed to provide the legally binding support for the RHAP 
(Florano 2003).  
The Agreement follows the normal format of international treaties affecting public policy and management. It 
comprises a preamble, definition of terms, overall objective, statement of principles, obligations of the signatory 
states, financial and institutional arrangements for implementing the Agreement, obligation of ratification by 
signatory states, and a reference to protocols which detail the procedures of implementation (Jones 2004). 
Several international principles and customary international law have been adopted into the Agreement’s legal 
framework, including the obligation not to cause environmental harm, the precautionary principle, the duty to 
cooperate, the principles of good neighbourliness, sustainable development, notification and information, public 
participation, and prevention (Nurhidayah 2012). 
The Agreement’s stated objective, under Article 2, is ‘to prevent and monitor transboundary haze pollution as a 
result of land and/or forest fires which should be mitigated, through concerted national efforts and intensified 
regional and international cooperation’ (ASEAN Secretariat 2002). The treaty upheld states’ sovereign right to 
exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies (ASEAN 
Secretariat 2002) among other international law principles as stated above (Article 3) (Florano 2003). Four 
rounds of negotiations for the ATHP were held between March 2011 and September 2011 (Nguitragool 2011). 
Negotiations were concluded and the ATHP was signed by all ten ASEAN member countries in 2002, in Kuala 
Lumpur.  
With the entry into force of the ATHP in 2003, specialised Technical Working Groups were tasked to develop 
the Comprehensive ASEAN Plan of Action on Transboundary Haze Pollution (ASEAN Secretariat 2007). The 
resulting Plan of Action included a cooperation mechanism for members to help Indonesia prevent haze by 
controlling fires, establishing early warning systems, exchanging information and technology, and providing 
mutual assistance (Khalik 2006).  
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Furthermore, a Panel of Experts (POE) was established to support the implementation of the Plan of Action. 
According to the Agreement, the POE ‘may be utilised when taking measures to mitigate the impact of land 
and/or forest fires or haze pollution arising from such fires, and also for the purpose of relevant training, 
education and awareness-raising campaigns’ (ASEAN Secretariat 2002). The POE was to provide rapid 
independent assessment and recommendations for the mobilization of resources. These experts were to be 
deployed to the fire sites and would provide their report and recommendations to governments. Article 5 of the 
ATHP also called for the establishment of an ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Haze in Indonesia, and a 
supporting ASEAN Haze Fund (Kurniawan 2002; Hudiono 2003), for the purposes of ‘facilitating cooperation 
and coordination among the parties in managing the impact of land and/or forest fires in particular haze 
pollution arising from such fires’ (ASEAN Secretariat 2002).  
The fact that the ATHP was legally binding was hoped to be a positive step forward to finally mitigating 
regional haze. Legally binding arrangements are largely regarded in the literature as a more effective type of 
agreement, as it is one of the most common and traditional ways for inducing targeted actors to change their 
behavior (Shelton 2003; Murray 2010). By virtue of being legally binding, scholars like Koh and Robinson 
hoped that the ATHP would be able to help aggregate individual national policy positions around the joint 
position of the earlier, non-binding ASEAN Regional Haze Action Plan of 1997 and facilitate its 
implementation (K. L. Koh and Robinson 2002). Other scholars noted that this was a positive reflection of the 
willingness of states to put aside the taboo of interference in one another’s affairs (Jones 2006; Smith 2000).  
However, this article argues that effective implementation of environmental agreements do not entirely rely on 
whether these initiatives are binding or non-binding (K. L.  Koh 2008). It argues that effective implementation 
also depends largely on the style of regional engagement in practice in a particular region. Within ASEAN, 
regional engagement focusing on the maintenance of national sovereignty (Murray 2010; Kim 2011) meant that 
states were compelled to ensure that the ATHP, even when legally binding, still observed their national interests, 
as opposed to the collective regional interest. 
Member states did this by insisting on close adherence to the spirit of the ASEAN Way. This ensured that the 
ATHP, while legally binding, was a highly watered down document where the costs of cooperation for 
concerned parties are greatly lowered (Nguitragool 2011). This resulted in a treaty that, although technically 
legally binding, was ‘vague and lacking in various hard-law instruments such as strong dispute-resolution and 
enforcement mechanisms.  
Important provisions, including those for developing preventive measures, and a national emergency response, 
are left to member parties to interpret and apply’ (Nguitragool 2011). Furthermore, unlike other relevant treaty 
regimes, no provision whatsoever is made for disputes to be settled by recourse to international courts or 
arbitration tribunals (A. K. Tan 2005). As Article 27 of the Agreement states, ‘any dispute between Parties as to 
the interpretation or application of, or compliance with, this Agreement or any protocol thereto, shall be settled 
amicably by consultation or negotiation’ (ASEAN Secretariat 2002). This wholly pre-empts the enforcement of 
compliance through legal principles of state responsibility and international liability (A. K. Tan 2005). Hence, 
the ATHP did not significantly differ from the Regional Haze Action Plan in either substance or in demands for 
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member parties to make policy changes (Nguitragool 2011). This watering-down process, is visible in the 
negotiation process leading up to the finalization of the ATHP.  
Due to the negative backlash from the haze issue, Secretariat representatives avidly argued the case for 
interference and the issue of consent of the receiving state for assistance during ASEAN-level meetings leading 
up to the finalisation of the ATHP. However, as the main drivers of the ASEAN organization are member states 
and not the Secretariat (Smith 2004; Narine 1998), member states had the final say and chose to prioritize 
sovereignty concerns over ensuring practical progress on the ground. Therefore, it was decided that ASEAN 
initiatives would strictly observe the norm of non-interference, and that assistance would only be upon the 
request of the receiving state. As Article 12 states, ‘assistance can only be employed at the request of and with 
the consent of the requesting Party, or, when offered by another Party or Parties, with the consent of the 
receiving Party’ (ASEAN Secretariat 2002). 
Furthermore, issues that were deemed too ‘sensitive’ were not discussed at all during negotiations. For example, 
one ASEAN staff member explained that even though there was an unspoken understanding that commercial 
plantation burning was the major source of haze, the issue of illegal burning by local and foreign plantation 
companies was never raised during discussions leading up to the ATHP. An NGO representative expressed that 
‘if ASEAN really wanted to address the haze problem’, the issue of plantations and transnational business 
would have had to be inserted into the ATHP as well. As a result of these negotiations, the ATHP provided only 
weak legal enforcement as it relies on the cooperation of its parties through self-regulation and decentralized 
operations, despite being legally binding (Florano 2003).  
For example, ASEAN officials explained that the strict observance of the non-interference norm within the 
ATHP (that dictate that assistance will only be activated upon request from the receiving state) rendered 
important new elements like the POE ineffective. Because of the non-interference requirements, there were very 
specific guidelines for deployment. In addition to approval by Indonesia, the POE team leader has to be 
Indonesian, and there has to be evidence of more than 250 hotspots over a period of two days. As a result, the 
POE was deployed only three times; to Indonesian provinces between August and October 2006 (Prasiddha 
2009). Indonesia also did on several occasions deny or delay entry of the POE, the latest of which was in 2009, 
even though all criteria for activation has been fulfilled. This enabled Indonesia to avoid opening its doors to 
unwanted external scrutiny of its internal and commercial practises.  
Thus, just like other haze initiatives before it, non-interference was strictly adhered to with the ATHP as a way 
to ensure that crucial economic interests of the involved states were preserved. This functional adherence to the 
ASEAN Way to preserve the interests of the economic and political elite can be observed in more detail when 
examining the conduct of Indonesia in response to the ATHP.  
4 Indonesia’s non-ratification of the ATHP 
The ATHP has currently been ratified by nine ASEAN states, with the Philippines being the ninth country to 
ratify in early 2010. Indonesia remains the only ASEAN member country yet to ratify the ATHP. The former 
Secretary General of ASEAN lamented Indonesia’s refusal to ratify the Agreement. He argued that since all ten 
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states had signed the Agreement in 2002, that meant that they all agreed to the spirit of the Agreement already, 
and ‘Indonesia should have no reason to withhold ratification’. Other interviewees argue that Indonesia signed 
on to the Agreement for political reasons; for the good image of the state within ASEAN, without having any 
intention to actually ratify. They reasoned that due to the norms of non-interference, Indonesia had nothing to 
lose by signing on to the Agreement as member states and the Secretariat could not force it to subsequently 
ratify. The Indonesian side of the story shows a more revealing explanation as to why Indonesia signed on to the 
ATHP, but has not as yet ratified it.  
The ATHP observes the ‘ASEAN minus X’ formula for ratification. This meant that the Agreement could be 
called into force with a minimum number of ratifications, and not all members were required to ratify the 
Agreement. Whle this is now a standard feature in international environmental treaty law, ASEAN officials 
explained that the ATHP was one of the earliest ASEAN mechanisms that practised this formula. The formula 
was adopted to enable individual member states to go further and faster individually ‘without upsetting 
consensus’ (Smith 2004). It helps shield member governments from having to commit to joint tasks that they did 
not have the administrative capacity to carry out, or tasks that they found politically difficult given dominant 
domestic interests (Nesadurai 2008).   
During the ATHP negotiations, officials foresaw that some countries would probably not ratify the ATHP. 
Therefore, the Secretariat proposed that this formula be applied to the ATHP out of concern that ‘countries that 
did not have such a large interest in the issue, like Laos, would not ratify’. Hence, Secretary General Rodolfo 
Severino had suggested the Agreement to enter into force with only six ratifications. This was inserted into the 
Agreement under Article 29, which states that ‘this Agreement shall enter into force on the sixtieth day after the 
deposit of the sixth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession’ (ASEAN Secretariat 2002). 
With this, in 2003, the ATHP became the first legally binding ASEAN environmental agreement to be entered 
into force (ASEAN Secretariat 2004) with six ratifications. Incidentally, Laos did ratify the ATHP, while 
Indonesian ratification is still pending.  
Despite the weakness of the ATHP in providing legal enforcement for the RHAP (Florano 2003), Indonesia, as 
the central country implicated in the haze, still considered the ATHP a risk to its crucial economic interests. As 
the following discussion elucidates, Indonesia’s non-ratification of the ATHP was important in maintaining the 
availability of, and access to plantation land (Elliott 2003) in Indonesia, to cater to its dominant domestic 
economic interests.  
This creates the free-rider situation (Larson and Soto 2008), where the importance of the oil palm industry to the 
Indonesian economy, coupled with the vested interests that have been cultivated among elites in the sector takes 
priority over the well-being of the Indonesian, Malaysian and Singaporean society, which continue to suffer 
annually as a result of haze. In cases like this, the government would not necessarily make decisions based on 
what is rational at the level of society, but instead would make decisions that benefit the well-connected 
minority. Even though ATHP ratification might be rational at the regional level, it makes less sense to the 
Indonesian political and business elites. This creates disincentives for Indonesia to ratify the ATHP. This has 
resulted in resistance to ratification at various levels in Indonesia, firstly at the ministerial level even before the 
treaty was elevated to parliament for ratification, and secondly at the parliamentary levels itself. 
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4.1 Resistance at the ministerial level 
At the ministerial level, the Forestry Ministry provided a strong counterweight to the Environment Ministry in 
ratification efforts at ASEAN. A former Indonesian Environment Minister explained that at the parliamentary 
level, the bill for the ratification at the ATHP has continually reached impasse. These are telling examples of 
how national interests and patronage politics intersect, resulting in regional outcomes that privilege economic 
actors that are close allies of the Indonesian political elite (Nesadurai 2008).  
There is a dearth of mutual cooperation among Indonesia’s domestic institutions (Nguitragool 2011), resulting 
in a certain hierarchy among government ministries. The Ministries of Forestry and Agriculture are the more 
powerful ministries, with greater mandate, manpower and budgetary resources (A. K. J. Tan 2004). Even though 
the Environment Ministry has been the engine of Indonesia’s environmental diplomacy and holds the mandate 
to negotiate environmental treaties on behalf of Indonesia, its officials barely wield decision-making authority 
over land and forest policy at the central bureaucratic level (Nguitragool 2011). The Environment Ministry 
remains a junior ministry within the Indonesian government, with no powers to force these other government 
ministries to comply with any requirements or expectations, or to enforce domestic laws (Nguitragool 2011; L. 
M. Syarif 2010). For example, the mandate to prevent fires in forest and plantation areas is under the inspection 
role of the Ministries of Forestry and Agriculture. Therefore, the institutions with actual authority to prevent the 
haze disaster have been distant from the ASEAN processes (Nguitragool 2011).  
This reflects Indonesia’s national priorities, where the utility of the forests and land as natural resources is 
viewed as more important than the preservation of the environment (Elliott 2003). In fact, the Environment 
Ministry has been described as ‘constitutionally not a policy-implementation agency of the government’ (Eaton 
and Radojevic 2001). For example, the Forestry Ministry is in charge of the licensing of forest exploitation 
concessions to private companies, while the Environment Ministry possesses only coordinating and supervisory 
functions (A. K. J. Tan 2004). As a result of this, interviewees explained that the Forestry and Agriculture 
Ministries have closer patronage dealings with plantation companies as compared to the Ministry of 
Environment. In contrast, the Ministry of Environment has limited authority and ability to mobilize support 
from influential actors. Therefore, while at ASEAN, often representatives from the Ministry of the Environment 
attend haze-related meetings on behalf of the government, the Ministry has largely been unable to influence 
decision-making in response to these regional outcomes at the domestic level (Nguitragool 2011).  
According to the Indonesian Ambassador to ASEAN, the ATHP was put together at the ASEAN level in a 
particularly rushed manner, because of the urgent pressure from civil society at that time. The Environment 
Ministry officials who represented Indonesia in ATHP negotiations were thus not able to adequately discuss the 
Agreement with other Indonesian ministries before signing it along with other member states. The Ambassador 
explained that this was why the treaty was signed by Indonesia at the ASEAN level; ‘because the Environment 
Ministry only was agreeable to it’. The Ambassador explained that if the other ministries were consulted prior to 
signing, ‘the ATHP would have looked much different than what it is today’. Therefore, it can be seen here that 
Indonesia signed on to the ATHP because the Indonesian representatives to ASEAN at the time consisted of 
Environment Ministry officials that were less influenced by national and patronage interests and had more of an 
interest in the regional environmental good.  
HELENA VARKKEY POST PRINT INT ENV AGREEMENTS 
10 
However, other more influential Indonesian decision-makers were against the ATHP, especially the Forestry 
Ministry. For example, one interviewee, a former Environment Minister, Dr. A. Sony Keraf was a state 
representative to ASEAN for the ATHP and was one of the initiators of the Agreement. He said that he was 
‘fully supportive of the Agreement’, but problems arose when he brought the treaty back home to the other 
ministries, especially the Forestry Ministry. As mentioned above, important individuals Forestry Ministry are 
known to have cultivated close patronage links with prominent players in the oil palm plantation sector. 
Furthermore, the Forestry Ministry also had a material interest in ensuring Indonesia’s economic progress 
through maintaining the availability of, and access to the country’s lucrative natural resources (Elliott 2003), 
which the ATHP threatened to disrupt. Interviewees however explained that despite this resistance, the 
Environment Ministry have been, and still are, running socialization exercises among the other ministries to 
garner support of the ATHP. 
4.2 Resistance at the parliamentary level 
According to Indonesian law, any regional or international treaty has to be enacted as a law, which requires a 
long tedious process of public hearings and meetings in the House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat) of the Indonesian parliament (Hudiono 2003). Despite resistance from the Forestry Ministry, the 
Environment Ministry completed the preliminary procedures for parliamentary ratification of the ATHP and 
submitted a proposal to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Secretariat in 2002 (Kurniawan 2002). The 
Environment Minister called for the urgent ratification of the Agreement, noting that it did not involve sanctions  
and would have more positive than negative effects on the country (Sijabat 2007). That year, the Environment 
Ministry and Indonesia’s House of Representatives agreed to speed up preparations for the ratification of the 
ATHP, stating that in principle, they have agreed to ratify the Agreement by mid-2003 in the latest. When this 
did not transpire, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and the Ministry of Forestry identified the pact as one 
of the most important bills to be passed in 2004 (Nguitragool 2011).  
However, as the years went on, it was announced that the State Secretariat was still considering the matter 
(Sijabat 2006). An interviewee argued that this delay was due to the influence that the more powerful Forestry 
Ministry had over the State Secretariat. By 2005, the bill had still not been publicized in regions across the 
country according to procedure (Sijabat 2006). In 2006, the State Secretariat finally allowed the ATHP bill to be 
considered among 78 bills the parliament would debate that year. However, the parliament decided to drop it 
from the agenda that year without explanation (Maulidia 2006). In 2007, a working committee of 40 legislators 
from three commissions overseeing defence and foreign affairs, agriculture and forestry affairs and environment 
affairs presented their views on the ATHP, but did not come to an agreement (Parliament of Singapore 2007; 
Sijabat 2007). In 2009, the House of Representatives highlighted the ASEAN Haze Agreement as one of the six 
priority bills to be ratified before their current term ended on 30
th
 of September (Parliament of Singapore 2009). 
However, this did not transpire that year, and until today, the treaty is still ‘stuck at parliament’. 
Other than the influence of the Forestry Ministry, sector lobby groups also had an important role in blocking 
ratification in parliament. In the patronage culture of Indonesia, lobby groups operate less as disciplined 
collectives but more as clusters of personal relationships. In this system, these groups were mainly interested in 
personal benefits for particular members (Kurer 1996). These groups often lobby parliamentarians to structure 
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parliamentary outcomes for the individual gain of their prominent members (Enderwick 2005) and block 
policies and treaties that might threaten their interests (Hamilton-Hart 2007). Indeed, the Indonesian parliament 
has been described as the ‘weakest state institution’ in Indonesia (Deutsch and Sender 2011) because of this 
undue private sector influence.  
The Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil Commission and Indonesian Palm Oil Association (GAPKI, or Gabungan 
Pengusaha Kelapa Sawit Indonesia) are examples of such powerful lobby groups, and have been influential in 
recommending and changing regulations in accordance to industry interests. As some interviewees stated, 
‘GAPKI has the power and influence to mould the future of the Indonesian palm oil industry’. GAPKI 
especially strongly lobbies for ‘the preservation of their heritage and way of life’, referring to the status quo of 
open burning operations in land clearing and the use of peatlands for plantations. GAPKI also has often used the 
‘nationalism card’ to influence parliamentarians not to ratify the ATHP, arguing that the Agreement would be an 
impingement on Indonesia’s sovereign status. GAPKI was against the Indonesian government ratifying the 
ATHP and accepting outside assistance because it was worried that member states would then be able to 
pressure the Indonesian government to take more serious action over the haze. One major concern of GAPKI 
was the fact that the ATHP allowed for additional protocols, and GAPKI was worried that this may later on 
include enforcement and liability clauses related to peatlands and use of fire, which would threaten the sector’s 
practices.  
Many interviewees pointed out that GAPKI is controlled by powerful Indonesian individuals with close personal 
relationships with prominent Members of Parliament, and with vested interests in maintaining the status quo in 
the plantation industry. For example, one NGO representative stated that the current Secretary General of 
GAPKI, Joko Supriyono, who is also a director at the major Indonesian plantation company Astra Agro, is 
known to have formidable influence with the Indonesian government and parliament due to his many years 
experience in the sector, and was instrumental in shaping the outcomes of many sector-related policy decisions.  
Interviewees explain that this endemic patronage culture has meant that ‘vested interests are playing a very 
strong role in hindering ratification’. Oil palm business interests are considered so influential in parliament that 
one interviewee went so far as to say that parliamentary debates on the ATHP are all just token, as given ‘the 
strength of the concessions, and the lobbying in the parliament and contributions both under and above the table 
of the plantation sector to the economy and to the elite, the ATHP will never get passed’. Hence, they argue that 
parliamentarian statements and positions on the ATHP were made based on the need to appease their powerful 
backers or constituents who have investments in the plantation sectors.  
As a result, many legislators have come out against ratification of the ATHP (Sijabat 2007). Hence, interviewees 
pointed out that arguments presented at the parliament against ratification have included quite feeble political, 
instead of environmental concerns. As discussed above, the ASEAN Way principles are often called upon by 
states in areas where crucial economic interests and dominant domestic interests are affected (Nesadurai 2008). 
For example, sovereignty concerns were raised with regard to fire fighting assistance under the ATHP despite 
the ATHP already containing specific clauses preserving the sovereignty of states during such assistance, as was 
pointed out by Dr. Keraf. For instance, parliamentarians and bureaucrats from local governments and local 
Forestry Institutions expressed concern that foreign firemen would use the knowledge they gain inside Indonesia 
HELENA VARKKEY POST PRINT INT ENV AGREEMENTS 
12 
wrongfully (Nguitragool 2011), like matters of terrain and defence. In light of extensive patronage networks 
related to haze, these concerns were actually more related to the worry that felonious patronage activities in 
remote areas could become transparent, and even exposed internationally (Nguitragool 2011). A Southeast 
Asian scholar that was interviewed explained that governments will always use things like sovereignty as an 
excuse, ‘because they cannot just come out and say that they have vested interests’ in the issue. 
Parliamentarians further argued that the Agreement unfairly placed all responsibility of the haze on Indonesia 
(Sijabat 2007). However, this was not the case as during negotiations, negotiators were very careful to word the 
Agreement in such ways that did not place blame on any particular country. For instance, Indonesia’s 
Environment Ministry officials that participated in the negotiation process of the ATHP had already ensured that 
the Agreement used more general, as opposed to specific terms for this very reason. Interviewees explained that 
contentious words included ‘Borneo’ (the island consisting of Indonesia’s Kalimantan and the Malaysian states 
of Sabah and Sarawak) replacing ‘Kalimantan, and ‘pollution’ replacing ‘transboundary pollution’ (because 
Indonesia argued that the haze was not always transboundary). Furthermore, as the term ‘haze’ normally denotes 
a naturally occurring climatic condition in which visibility is affected (McLellan 2001), ASEAN cautiously 
added it to the term ‘smoke’, thus referring to the phenomenon as ‘smoke haze’ in order to prevent criminalising 
Indonesia (Nguitragool 2011). In fact, throughout the history of haze cooperation at the ASEAN level, Indonesia 
has never been called upon by its ASEAN neighbours to bear state responsibility for breaching its obligation to 
control its forest and land fires and to incur international liability for the transboundary haze damage caused to 
other states (A. K. Tan 2005). However, despite the neutral language of the Agreement, parliamentarians still 
chose to view the Agreement as unfairly laying responsibility upon Indonesia.  
Parliamentarians also argued that ASEAN members were selfishly pushing Indonesia to ratify without 
considering Indonesia’s interests. They argued that Indonesia did not benefit sufficiently from the Agreement, 
and it would benefit other ASEAN members more (Parliament of Singapore 2010; Budianto 2008; Maulidia 
2006). In reality, the Indonesian people in Kalimantan and Sumatra closest to the source of the fires would 
benefit most from the treaty and the clean air that it was hoped to bring (Parliament of Singapore 2010). Clearly, 
the interests that the parliamentarians had in mind here was not the social well-being of its people, but instead 
the economic interests and practises of the oil palm plantation sector that was at stake with the ATHP.  
Parliamentarians also argued that the legal consequences of ratification was heavy (Sijabat 2007), as Indonesia 
would have to amend many of its regulations by adding a clause on zero burning and controlled burning 
practises (Budianto 2008), and also limit activity on peatlands. However, interviewees noted that Indonesia 
already has all these provisions in their law. Parliamentarians also said that the government did not have enough 
money and was not financially prepared to support the tighter monitoring that was required in the Agreement. 
Hence, they argued that ratification of the ATHP would be a burden to the relatively poorer (compared to 
Malaysia and Indonesia) Indonesia financially (Jakarta Post 2006), since fighting large-scale land and forest 
fires is an expensive and difficult task because the Indonesian archipelago is vast and the fires are largely peat-
based (Nguitragool 2011). This stance ignores the strong general recognition that the state's economic level 
cannot be used to discharge it from its obligations under international law (A. K. J. Tan 1999). Furthermore, 
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interviewees explained that ratification would somewhat address this concern because this would allow 
Indonesia access to the Haze Fund that was set up with the ATHP. 
To further substantiate the case for non-ratification, parliamentarians argued that even without the Agreement, 
the state had still managed to reduce the number of hotspots in 2007 by more than 70%. However, interviewees 
noted that this reduction could be credited to the mild El Niño cycle that did not create the severe drought 
conditions that help fires spread, not on action on the ground. Furthermore, some parliamentarians argue that 
there is no real difference to Indonesia whether the Agreement is ratified or otherwise, since it will not be faced 
with any sanctions anyway, and Indonesia already has the necessary laws and projects in place (contradicting 
the legal burden argument as stated above). Also, they argue that since there is already some cooperation 
happening anyway through earlier ASEAN agreements and action plans, ratification was a mere unimportant 
formality.  
The Environment and Foreign Affairs Ministries have tried to convince parliamentarians to ratify the treaty first, 
and then add protocols for issues that they were concerned about later. These ministries were worried that 
Indonesia would miss out on the benefits of the ATHP, especially on the opportunity to show diplomatic 
goodwill that was gained by signing the ATHP, by delaying its ratification (Parliament of Singapore 2010; 
Hudiono 2003). However, parliamentarians have stood their ground and insisted that they would only ratify the 
treaty if amendments according to their requests were made first. As no further progress in response to 
Indonesia’s ‘concerns’ have been made at ASEAN, Indonesia’s parliamentary stalemate still stands.  
5 Non ratification limiting effectiveness of the treaty 
Indonesia's failure to ratify the ATHP has limited the effectiveness of the treaty in terms of fire-fighting, 
coordination, policy-making and future evolution of the Agreement. Firstly, as part of the ATHP mechanism, if 
a serious forest fire was spotted by the ASEAN Specialised Meteorological Centre, neighbouring states could 
activate fire fighting services and move in, without having to write in to the receiving government to get 
diplomatic clearance for aircrafts and permission from local fire services (Khalik 2006). However, this clause 
was only applicable if both countries have ratified the treaty. Therefore, even with the ATHP in force, assistance 
still could not be deployed immediately without ratification by Indonesia. On both matters of the POE and fire 
fighting assistance, interviewees suggested that the real reason behind Indonesia’s reluctance was because the 
fires were on plantation land of particular well-connected individuals, and the Indonesian government did not 
want these outside parties like the POE to be exposed to this fact. 
Secondly, non-ratification has also delayed the establishment of the ASEAN Coordination Centre for Haze and 
its dedicated Secretariat. This Centre and its Secretariat would have been useful for coordinating information 
and cooperation efforts around the region
3
 (ASEAN Secretariat 2002). During negotiations, ministers reached 
                                                 
3
 The Annex of the Agreement goes into the details of the Centre’s visualized role, including to:  
a) Establish and maintain regular contact with the respective National Monitoring Centres regarding the 
data, including those derived from satellite imagery and meteorological observation, relating to land and /or 
forest fire, environmental conditions conducive to such fires; and air quality and levels of pollution, in 
particular haze arising from such fires; 
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agreement that the Centre and Secretariat would be established as soon as possible, and was set to be located in 
Riau, Sumatra. This was hoped to fuel more awareness and ownership of the fire problem in the Riau 
administration. An interviewee from the Environment Ministry explained that ‘in the spirit of sovereignty’, 
Indonesia was granted substantial control over the Centre, for instance on selection of experts working in the 
Centre. However this Centre and Secretariat has yet to be established, pending Indonesia’s ratification of the 
treaty. As a result, the ASEAN Secretariat, with limited staff spread over many departments, still functions as an 
interim Secretariat for haze matters in the region instead of a dedicated Secretariat under the Centre.  
Thirdly, due to Indonesia’s non-ratification, interviewees admit that ASEAN-level initiatives have not been able 
to ‘address sensitive issues’ like influencing Indonesian forest policy and the implementation of laws. Article 9 
of the Agreement does call for the development of ‘appropriate policies to curb activities that may lead to land 
and/or forest fires’ (ASEAN Secretariat 2002), however this is only applicable to ratified states. Hence, an 
interviewee pointed out that the success of ASEAN-level initiatives is ‘essentially dependent on the Indonesian 
government, not on ASEAN’. Therefore, while regional systems of environmental governance can be an 
important complement to environmental governance, efforts at the national level suffered (K. L. Koh and 
Robinson 2002), and like many previous ASEAN-level environmental initiatives, haze mitigation at ASEAN 
has been ineffective. 
Furthermore, because the haze treaty was embedded within an institution in which the principle of consensus 
was dense, the opponents of intervention could reject the entire treaty or legitimately obstruct any clause or 
provision that would lead to an encroachment on a state’s sovereignty (Nguitragool 2011). Therefore, despite 
non-ratification, Indonesia in reality still retains influence of the direction of haze action in the region. The 
observation of the ASEAN Way in haze initiatives has allowed Indonesia to assert its sovereign right in 
selectively adopting or ignoring elements of the ATHP in ways that protect its crucial economic interests 
(Nesadurai 2008). This further limits the effective haze mitigation at the ASEAN level. 
6 Conclusion 
Cooperation on matters of environmental protection is widely accepted as a basic obligation of international 
law. Whether the rules of international cooperation are being effectively embraced must be measured by 
whether the response is proportional to the need. If states effectively cooperated to abate the problem, then the 
level of such action may be deemed adequate to satisfy the duty to cooperate under international law. In the case 
of the legally-binding ATHP, the International Law obligation to cooperate was ineffective in producing action 
proportionate to the need (Robinson 2000-2001).  
                                                                                                                                                        
b) Facilitate co-operation and co-ordination among the Parties to increase their preparedness for and to 
respond to land and/or forest fires or haze pollution arising from such fires; 
c) Facilitate co-ordination among the Parties, other States and relevant organisations in taking effective 
measures to mitigate the impact of land and/or forest fires or haze pollution arising from such fires; and 
d) Respond to a request for or offer of assistance in the event of land and/or forest fires or haze 
pollution resulting from such fires by transmitting promptly the request for assistance to other States and 
organizations; and co-ordinating such assistance, if so requested by the requesting Party or offered by the 
assisting Party (ASEAN Secretariat 2002, pp. 23-24). 
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This article has thus argued that the implementation of and compliance with international law or, in this case, 
the implementation and compliance of ASEAN instruments by a member state does not entirely rely on whether 
these initiatives are binding or non-binding (K. L.  Koh 2008). This instead depends largely on the style of 
regional engagement in practice in a particular region. The ASEAN region still retains their ASEAN Way values 
in its approach to regional environmental cooperation (Nurhidayah 2012), which often results in agreements that 
upholds national priorities over regional interests. In this case, the ATHP was adopted using a very loose, vague 
expression of the doctrine of state responsibility (L. O. M. Syarif 2007). With the ATHP, state sovereignty and 
non-interference in internal affairs are still paramount, the consent of the state where the fires occur is still 
needed for international action, and the tools prescribed do not appear to be any more sophisticated or effective 
than earlier ASEAN-level haze mitigation efforts (A. K. Tan 2005).  
These institutional practises that tend to reinforce sovereignty and non-interference tend to limit innovation and 
prevent harsh criticisms of Indonesia (Ortuoste 2008). Therefore, due to the ASEAN style of regional 
engagement that prioritizes national sovereignty, the negotiations, outcomes, and implementation of the ATHP 
was able to be strategically shaped by member states to preserve national political and economic interests 
(Muhamad Varkkey 2012), in this case being the interests of the patrons and clients in the Indonesian oil palm 
plantation sector.  
Hence, it can be seen that international principles of state responsibility and international cooperation provide 
scant help in coping with fires and haze in Southeast Asia (Robinson 2000-2001), and have so far been of no 
assistance in finding solutions to these fires and haze. The failure of Indonesia and ASEAN to deal effectively 
with the problem (S. Tay 1998) demonstrates the powerful economic and political constraints, both regionally 
within ASEAN and internally within Indonesia, which severely impede the Agreement's effectiveness (A. K. 
Tan 2005). As a result, instead of offering solutions to the transboundary haze problem, engagement at the 
ASEAN level has served to protect the interests of the oil palm plantation sector and the well-connected elites 
that control it, while allowing the haze to persist.  
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